Sunday, June 24, 2001
There's hope for Reds, just not this year
New ballpark, new talent may blot out this woeful season
By Tim Sullivan and John Erardi
The Cincinnati Enquirer
The billboard depicts Ken Griffey Jr. and declares The Future Is Now. The standings say next year can't start too soon. The Cincinnati Reds are a mixed message of a baseball franchise — dedicated to development, but hamstrung by high-salaried veterans; alternately frugal and reckless; consistently confusing.
If 2003 and the debut of Great American Ball Park represent hope and perspective, the 2001 season has been defined by its disarray, by insults and injuries, friction and fighting. Though the Reds had won three in a row before Saturday night 9-3 loss at Houston, their record of 28-45 finds them in fifth place in the National League's Central Division, 15 1/2 games out of first. This year's version of baseball's oldest professional ballclub is in danger of supplanting the 1982 Reds (61-101) as the losingest team in franchise history, and it is approaching soap opera standards for characters in conflict.
In the last 30 days alone:
• General manager Jim Bowden and team physician Dr. Timothy Kremchek skirmished over a purported “misdiagnosis” of Griffey.
• Reliever Danny Graves remarked that the difference between playing in Cleveland and Cincinnati was that, “here, you never really know what's going on half the time.”
• Outfielder Dmitri Young said pitcher Rob Bell became “the luckiest man” in the clubhouse upon being traded.
• Manager Bob Boone called a clubhouse meeting to complain about a lack of “professional results” from his players.
• Coaches Tim Foli and Ron Oester brawled in the clubhouse during an eight-game losing streak.
“When you go through a tough stretch like we did during the month of May and the first weeks of June, that's tough to take, especially when you have a lot of pride,” says John Allen, the Reds chief operating officer. “You don't like to see some of the frustrations that come out, but, by the same token, it shows that they care.”
In a town where baseball is more than entertainment, where tradition runs so deep it could strike oil, the 2001 season has been replete with disturbing developments. Baseball is not a pastime in Cincinnati, but a preoccupation. Lately, it has been a pain.
Less than two years removed from the new ballpark's opening, the Reds' continued turbulence appears to be primarily a surface problem. Deeper in the organization, in scouting and development, there is evidence of order and cause for hope.
Baseball America, a publication focused on the minor leagues, rated the Reds' system No. 3 among the 30 major-league clubs last year. Despite some of this season's difficulties and some strategic detours, the plan to field a contending team in the new stadium in 2003 remains plausible.
“The foundation is pretty strong,” says Tim Naehring, the Reds director of player development. “We might have to make some repairs to the roof you're seeing.”
Many injuries, no depth
Decorum is often a casualty in losing seasons, and the Reds' frustrations may be particularly high because so many of their problems have been a product of injury.
By the end of May, nine Reds had been placed on the disabled list. Seth Etherton and Scott Williamson, both projected to pitch in the starting rotation, have totaled two-thirds of one inning. Pete Harnisch, ostensibly the club's top starter, went on the DL on May 11 with one victory.
Griffey's torn hamstring delayed his first hit of the season until June 15 — the Reds' 65th game of the season. Their record that night fell to 25-40.
Yet some of the turmoil in the Reds' clubhouse is attributable to issues other than the win-loss record: 58 player transactions, bitter bargaining and the inability of management to articulate a vision that reconciles tight budgets and Deion Sanders experiments.
“The last couple of years, they had a very, very good bench,” former Reds first baseman Hal Morris says. “The year they won 96 games (1999), they had (Jeffrey) Hammonds, (Eddie) Taubensee, (Chris) Stynes and Michael Tucker. They had a bunch of guys who could've started for other clubs.
“They had to trade Hammonds, Taubensee and Stynes. Their depth was severely hampered. Before, Jim (Bowden) had been able to take the money and put together a nice bench. This year, he wasn't able to do that as much.”
Payroll puts team behind
On the major-league level, owner Carl Lindner's management team has been building toward the new ballpark with a set of plans that has been repeatedly revised and has sometimes seemed contradictory.
The chance to acquire a star of Griffey's stature and the cost of Lindner's loyalty to shortstop Barry Larkin has left Bowden a top-heavy $43 million payroll. Though increased ticket prices have increased revenue despite a 22 percent drop in home attendance, Bowden may be compelled to reduce the Reds' salary obligations by the July 31 interleague trading deadline.
Allen declined comment on the Reds' payroll plans, but second baseman Pokey Reese and outfielder Dmitri Young have been the subjects of trade rumors for weeks. Both players will be eligible for free agency after the 2002 season, and both have rejected contract proposals without bothering to make counteroffers.
Arguably, neither player contributes enough on offense to merit a long-term contract from a low-budget team in an inflated marketplace. Though Reese and Young were once considered core components for 2003 — the Reds had once said they wouldn't trade for Griffey if Seattle wanted Reese — they are now viewed as expendable.
Help on the way
If The Future Is Now, it is ominous. In a month, the Reds might be breaking in two new regulars if Reese and Young are traded. If the future is 2003, however, there may be help on the horizon.
Rising revenues from the new ballpark and a more fertile farm system should eventually make the Reds more competitive. Because much of the Reds' prime talent is concentrated at lower levels of the minor leagues, the 2003 timetable might be ambitious. Yet there are probably more legitimate prospects in the Reds' pipeline than at any time since the mid-1980s talent explosion that included Larkin, Eric Davis, Paul O'Neill and Tom Browning, the heart of the 1990 world championship team.
“The prospects we have now, compared to what we had two years ago, are night and day,” Bowden says. “It's not even close.”
Minor-league outfielders Adam Dunn and Wily Mo Pena have been invited to participate in next month's All-Star “Futures” game in Seattle. Naehring calls Dunn a “can't-miss superstar.”
Other prominent prospects include outfielder Austin Kearns; infielders Gookie Dawkins and Ranier Olmedo; catcher Dane Sardinha; and pitchers Ty Howington and Ryan Snare.
For much of the 2001 season, the Reds have been forced to match their minor-league talent against major-league teams. Aaron Boone, Griffey and Larkin were on the disabled list for prolonged periods, and Harnisch, Williamson and Etherton are still out with injuries.
“It's one of those years where Plan A hasn't panned out, so you have to go to Plans B and C and D,” says Doc Rodgers, the Reds assistant general manager. “You want to be as competitive as you can for your fans and for yourself, (but) you have to have one eye on the present and another on the future.”
Little margin for error
Not so long ago, Reds executives looked to the future with dread. Marge Schott's hand-to-mouth management style largely neglected scouting and development and forced the Reds to rely on costly imports. When Allen assumed command of the Reds' day-to-day operations in 1996, he quickly rebalanced the budget to devote more money to the minor leagues at the expense of quick-fix free agents.
The transition, however, has not been seamless. Without a significant stash of ready cash or a reliable flow of minor-league talent, the Reds' margin for error has been minuscule. Their key injuries, then, tend to be catastrophic. To some, their allocation of resources to Griffey and Larkin seems misguided. Griffey's contract pays him $12.5 million annually, about half of which is deferred. Larkin earns $9 million annually, $3 million of it deferred.
“One or two guys are not going to take you to the top,” former Reds manager Jack McKeon says. “You need a whole bunch of guys. And you better have pitching, No. 1.”
Other than finances, finding pitching has been the Reds' most persistent problem for two decades. At the end of last season, there were 97 active pitchers who had won at least 50 games in the major leagues. Nine of them were originally signed by the Los Angeles Dodgers. None of them were originally signed by the Reds.
“You hear the same thing year after year,” says Reds minority owner Bill Reik. “(But) talking about pitching is almost silly. Everybody says you've got to get starting pitching, but where do you get them? You don't go to Wal-Mart and get three starting pitchers.”
The Dodgers did it by cultivating the Caribbean and prowling the Pacific Rim. They signed Dominican prospect Pedro Martinez, Japan's Hideo Nomo and Korea's Chan Ho Park when Reds scouts were generally restricted to drafting American talent and expected to weigh affordability as well as skill.
For years, the Reds' Caribbean operation consisted primarily of the spare-time scouting of former outfielder Sam Mejias. Now, the Reds have numbers and nurturing.
“Back when we had no English-speaking classes, there was no patience,” Bowden says. “We'd bring a 17-year-old kid over (to the Gulf Coast League), but you can't just play him a few times and release him. The kid just got to the States! He just ate his first Big Mac! It takes the body awhile to adjust to that.”
Finding home-grown talent
Similarly, a bigger budget for the domestic draft has expanded Bowden's trading stock and reduced his dependency on his major-league roster.
“When you're ranked the third-best farm system in baseball, you're going to have players who are going to play for you in the future,” Rodgers says. “We couldn't have said that with any kind of confidence in the past.”
Front-office officials are forever hyping their own players — if for no other reason than to enhance their trade value — but Allen says he's been encouraged by the opinions of more objective sources.
One reason the Reds have been slow to sign any of their young players to long-term contracts is the expectation that the team will be able to replace them with superior talent at a lower price.
“You only have control of them at a low cost in the big leagues for three years (before qualifying for salary arbitration),” Rodgers says. “You're either going to pay them or you're going to move them.”
Naehring has sought to speed the progress of Reds' prospects by streamlining the organization's instruction and evaluation.
“If we sign Joe Blow, the first thing we get is an initial scouting report,” Naehring says. “It talks about the player's ability on the baseball field, his family, his hobbies. We try to give our people a sense of who this player is.”
These initial reports, and those that follow each player, are disseminated among all the Reds' field personnel — coaches, managers, instructors, strength and conditioning staff, etc. Information that had been acquired haphazardly is now systematically computerized, so a roving instructor should know ahead of time which infielders need help with their backhands. As players progress, the computer should also reveal the biases and blind spots of specific scouts.
Filing reports has become part of each coach's and manager's job description, and late reports are now punishable by fine.
“We haven't had to fine anyone yet,” Naehring says. “There was one instance where a guy was close to being fined, but his computer had a glitch. Had a problem synchronizing with the master database.”
Details behind the scenes
Dr. Kremchek, the Reds' medical director, has seen a positive change in the club's attention to detail. Ultimately, he says, this is more meaningful than the examples of internal friction that influence perceptions of the front office.
“I can't remember who the player development guy was when I first started with the Reds,” Dr. Kremchek says. “I talk to Tim Naehring four times a day.
“When you lose, everyone throws darts and wants to say you're dysfunctional. But to me, it runs smoother (than in the past). It's a lot more efficient. It's a lot better than it was five years ago.”
Before the June amateur draft, Dr. Kremchek examined detailed medical reports on roughly 100 prospects and divided them by relative risk of injury. Never before have the Reds subjected so many prospects to health screens. Never again should the Reds waste a high draft choice on a hitter with vision problems, as they did in 1996 with first-round pick John Oliver.
Oliver's selection was symptomatic of several problems that plagued the Reds' scouting system during Mrs. Schott's ownership. Some of these were a function of funding; others were attributable to organizational philosophy.
Mrs. Schott's reluctance to spend on scouting meant prospects were often evaluated only by a single scout rather than the more comprehensive cross-checking performed by other clubs. Because many of the Reds veteran scouts left the club during this period for more money or fewer hassles, responsibility often fell on relatively inexperienced eyes.
Traditionally, Reds scouts were trained to concentrate on a player's most tangible assets — foot speed and arm strength — with less emphasis on baseball-specific skills such as hitting and pitching. Oliver excited the scouts because he could run and throw, but shortly after he was drafted, Bowden determined he would not hit at the major-league level.
Less than three months after Oliver was drafted, Allen took charge of Reds' decision-making. Among his first moves was to bolster the scouting and development budgets. Bowden resolved to change the Reds' obsession with stopwatches and radar guns. Reds scouts were told to find hitters who could actually hit and pitchers who could get people out.
Drafting remains an inexact science, but the Reds appear to be making fewer mistakes.
“If you take one guy who's going to blow up, you can't afford that,” Dr. Kremchek says. “Maybe if you're the Yankees, you can do that. But not when you're a small-market operation and you can't spend a lot of dough.”
New park draws dollars
So long as Lindner is involved, Reds' spending patterns will surely continue to be a reflection of their revenues. The good news is that with Great American Ball Park under construction, those revenues are already rising.
Six companies have leased “Founders suites” at an up-front cost of $1.2 million apiece. Forty-nine additional suites have been leased for an annual intake of $4.2 million. Jenny Gardner, director of new stadium development, estimated that two-thirds of the 175 “Diamond Seats” are committed at $14,175 per seat per season.
The five clubs to open ballparks since last season — Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh and San Francisco — have raised their payrolls by at least $10 million each since 1998.
“The key thing is not to plan on the new ballpark being a pot of gold,” says Cleveland Indians vice president Bob DiBiasio. “It's not a panacea. If you don't have a plan, and if you don't articulate that plan for the fans, you're going to have problems.”
Things change. Five years ago, when Reds executives spoke of the future, they meant 2003. Later, they came to expect more instant gratification. Now, tomorrow again looks brighter than today.
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There's hope for Reds, just not this year
